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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► We surveyed every issue of four journals for a recent 
12-month period; hence, the results are compre-
hensive and up to date.
 ► This was not a systematic review, but was restrict-
ed to four high-impact general journals. This means 
that we cannot draw any conclusions about other 
publications.
 ► Our classification system was developed by the au-
thors and is not a validated tool.
 ► We only looked at reporting in abstracts; in the main 
text of papers, authors may have made different and 
more accurate statements.
AbStrACt
Objectives To describe and summarise how the results 
of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) that did not find a 
significant treatment effect are reported, and to estimate 
how commonly trial reports make unwarranted claims.
Design We performed a retrospective survey of published 
RCTs, published in four high impact factor general medical 
journals between June 2016 and June 2017.
Setting Trials conducted in all settings were included.
Participants 94 reports of RCTs that did not find a 
difference in their main comparison or comparisons were 
included.
Interventions All interventions.
Primary and secondary outcomes We recorded the 
way the results of each trial for its primary outcome or 
outcomes were described in Results and Conclusions 
sections of the Abstract, using a 10-category classification. 
Other outcomes were whether confidence intervals (CIs) 
and p values were presented for the main treatment 
comparisons, and whether the results and conclusions 
referred to measures of uncertainty. We estimated 
the proportion of papers that made claims that were 
not justified by the results, or were open to multiple 
interpretations.
results 94 trial reports (120 treatment comparisons) 
were included. In Results sections, for 58/120 comparisons 
(48.3%) the results of the study were re-stated, without 
interpretation, and 38/120 (31.7%) stated that there was 
no statistically significant difference. In Conclusions, 
65/120 treatment comparisons (54.2%) stated that there 
was no treatment benefit, 14/120 (11.7%) that there 
was no significant benefit and 16/120 (13.3%) that there 
was no significant difference. CIs and p values were both 
presented by 84% of studies (79/94), but only 3/94 studies 
referred to uncertainty when drawing conclusions.
Conclusions The majority of trials (54.2%) inappropriately 
interpreted a result that was not statistically significant 
as indicating no treatment benefit. Very few studies 
interpreted the result as indicating a lack of evidence 
against the null hypothesis of zero difference between the 
trial arms.
IntrODuCtIOn
Reports of randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) usually attempt to draw conclusions 
about treatment effectiveness from their 
statistical analysis. It is common for results 
that pass a threshold for statistical signifi-
cance, usually a p value of less than 0.05, to 
be interpreted as indicating a real and clin-
ically important effect. ‘Non-significance’ 
(p>0.05) is often taken to mean that there is 
no difference between the treatments, or that 
the intervention is not effective. As has been 
pointed out many times, this is an erroneous 
conclusion.1 2 Failure to reach a conven-
tional threshold for ‘statistical significance’ 
does not mean that it is safe to conclude that 
there is no difference. Every statistical test 
has a type II error rate, which is the proba-
bility of obtaining a non-significant result, if 
the null hypothesis is false (there really is a 
difference). Trials are often designed with a 
20% type II error rate (80% power), for a true 
treatment effect of a specified size. With such 
a design, even if the true treatment effect is 
exactly as assumed (and designs often assume 
unrealistically large treatment effects), 
non-significance would be expected 20% of 
the time, and a conclusion of no difference 
would be wrong. Moreover, common issues 
such as fewer recruits than expected, more 
variability, or a lower incidence of outcomes, 
will reduce power and make non-significant 
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results more likely, even if in reality there is a real and 
important treatment effect. There is no way of discrim-
inating between non-significant results that derive from 
chance or lack of power, and those that derive from a true 
lack of treatment benefit, except by more research.
Misinterpretation of non-significant results in clinical 
trials may be particularly damaging, because trials provide 
high-quality evidence, and their results often determine 
clinical guidelines and practice. Erroneous conclusions 
of ineffectiveness may result in non-adoption or aban-
donment of treatments that could actually be beneficial, 
and the existence of an apparently ‘definitive’ trial that 
concluded ineffectiveness is likely to discourage further 
research. This problem was identified over 20 years ago3 
(‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’), and 
subsequent studies have documented its persistence.4 5
The motivation for this study was our observation that, 
despite these warnings, poor interpretations of non-con-
clusive trial results remain common, even in the most 
prestigious journals. Many trials where the main results 
are not statistically significant conclude that there is no 
difference between the treatments, the intervention did 
not improve outcomes, or that it was not effective, none 
of which is a justified interpretation.
We examined how results were described in the 
Abstracts of recent reports of RCTs where the primary 
outcome did not show a statistically significant difference 
between the treatment arms, published in four leading 
general medical journals.
MethODS
We hand searched issues of four journals (New England 
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), The Lancet and British Medical Journal 
(BMJ)) published between June 2016 and June 2017. 
Papers were included if they were primary reports of RCTs 
that had results for their primary outcome that were not 
statistically significant’ that is, did not reach a pre-spec-
ified threshold p value that was regarded as indicating 
a true effect. We excluded non-inferiority, equivalence, 
single armed, dose-finding and pharmacokinetic trials, as 
they have different reporting issues, and those that used 
Bayesian statistical methods. We included trials with more 
than two arms, and trials with multiple primary compari-
sons, if no treatment differences were claimed.
We extracted information from the abstract of each 
report on the description (from Results or Findings 
section) and interpretation (from Conclusions or Inter-
pretation section) of the trial's results for the primary 
outcome or outcomes. We concentrated on the abstracts 
because these are the most frequently viewed parts of 
papers, so conclusions expressed here will have the most 
impact. We classified the descriptions into ten categories 
(table 1). The classification was developed at the start 
of the project, by reviewing trial reports from the same 
journals that were published in January to May 2016, the 
period immediately before our study’s eligibility window. 
The classification made a distinction between reporting 
that claimed a lack of directional effect (eg, ‘no improve-
ment’) and reporting that did not include any directional 
information (eg, ‘no difference’), as well as whether the 
claim was qualified by reference to statistical significance 
(eg, ‘no significant difference’) or something else (eg, 
‘no substantial difference’). We created additional cate-
gories during the study for reports that used methods that 
did not fit into any of the predetermined categories; for 
example, statements such as ‘there was a lack of evidence 
for a difference,’ or ‘treatments were similar’. We also 
recorded whether confidence intervals (CIs) and p values 
were presented, and whether the CI, or uncertainty more 
generally, was referred to in the conclusions.
Data were extracted by both authors independently and 
discrepancies resolved by discussion, leading to consensus 
in all cases. The authors were not blinded to the journals 
and authorship of individual articles.
reSultS
We identified 351 trial reports, of which 257 were not 
eligible, leaving 94 eligible papers, which reported 
120 treatment comparisons (figure 1). Three journals 
published the majority of studies (JAMA 28, Lancet 26, 
NEJM 32 and BMJ 8). Significance tests were presented 
for 94/120 (78.3%) comparisons (79/94 papers (84%)), 
and CIs for 96/120 (80%) comparisons (79/94 papers 
(84%)).
In Results section (figure 2), the most common 
reporting style was to present the point estimate and CI, 
without any interpretation (58/120; 48.3%). A substan-
tial number also referred to lack of statistical significance 
(38/120; 31.7%) or stated that there was no difference 
(9/120; 7.5%) or no improvement (7/120; 5.8%).
In Conclusions (figure 3), a substantial majority of 
comparisons were classified as stating that there was no 
treatment benefit (65/120; 54.2%). The main alternative 
approach was to re-state the lack of a statistically signif-
icant difference (16/120; 13.3%) or lack of statistically 
significant benefit (14/120; 11.7%).
Results for papers rather than comparisons were similar 
(table 1).
A threshold of p<0.05 for statistical significance was 
used in all but two studies, which used lower values (0.04 
and 0.01), as part of a correction for multiple compari-
sons. Similarly, all except these two studies used 95% CIs. 
CIs for the main treatment comparison were presented 
by 79/94 studies (84.0%). This was surprisingly low, given 
that they have been a required part of trial reporting in 
the CONSORT guidelines for many years. Those that did 
not present CIs for the main comparison either presented 
CIs for the difference of each randomised group from 
baseline, or used only p values. Both of these are poor 
reporting practices. The proportion of trials presenting 
p values was the same (79/94; 84%). Sixty-four studies 
presented both CIs and p values, 15 CIs without p values, 
and 15 only p values. Very few trials (3/94; 3.2%) explicitly 
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Figure 1 Flowchart of studies.
Figure 2 Frequencies of different types of description of 
results in Results section of Abstracts (n=120 treatment 
comparisons). Categories (described fully in table 1): 1. 
no difference; 2. no statistically significant difference; 
3. no substantial or clinically important difference; 4. no 
improvement or no treatment benefit; 5. no significant 
improvement; 6. no substantial improvement; 7. lack of 
evidence for a difference; 8. treatments were similar; 9. 
statement of results; 10. clinical recommendation.
Figure 3 Frequencies of different types of description of 
results in Conclusions section of Abstracts (n=120 treatment 
comparisons). Categories (described fully in table 1): 1. 
no difference; 2. no statistically significant difference; 
3. no substantial or clinically important difference; 4. no 
improvement or no treatment benefit; 5. no significant 
improvement; 6. no substantial improvement; 7. lack of 
evidence for a difference; 8. treatments were similar; 9. 
statement of results; 10. clinical recommendation.
referred to the CI or uncertainty around the treatment 
effect estimate when drawing conclusions.
DISCuSSIOn
Main results
Over 50% of the studies interpreted a non-significant 
result inappropriately, as indicating that there was ‘no 
difference’ or ‘no benefit’ to the intervention. Lack of 
statistical significance does not mean that no difference 
exists; this is one of the most basic misinterpretations of 
significance testing.1
Many of the studies that concluded a lack of benefit had 
substantial uncertainty about the direction and size of the 
treatment effect. For example, one trial concluded that 
the incidence of the outcome was ‘not reduced’ by the 
intervention, based on a risk ratio of 1.13 (95% CI 0.63, 
2.00).6 The CI indicates that both substantial reduction 
or substantial increase (risk ratios as low as 0.63 or as high 
as 2.00) are compatible with the data, so the conclusion 
of no reduction does not seem justified. Conversely, some 
trials concluded ‘no benefit’ when the results were actu-
ally strongly in one direction. One trial that concluded 
that the intervention was ‘not found to be superior,’ with 
an HR of 0.89 and a 95% CI of 0.78 to 1.01.7 The conclu-
sion seems inadequate; the study did suggest benefit, but 
not strongly enough to meet the arbitrary criterion for 
statistical significance. It does not seem reasonable for 
the conclusions from these two examples to be so similar, 
when the results are substantially different.
A further 24.3% of comparisons qualified their conclu-
sion of lack of treatment benefit by referring to statis-
tical significance (categories 2 and 5). This description 
is uninformative, because simply knowing that an arbi-
trary threshold was not achieved does not give much 
useful information, and relies on the reader being able to 
decode correctly what ‘significant’ means in this context. 
It invites confusion between the technical meaning of 
‘statistical significance’ and the common English meaning 
of the word (important, substantial, worthy of attention), 
especially as results are often reported using phrases such 
as ‘not significantly different’ or ‘no significant benefit’ 
which can be read (and make sense) either as a statement 
about a formal statistical significance test, or as a regular 
English sentence. There is substantial empirical evidence 
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Table 2 Examples of accurate statements for describing non-significant frequentist results, from https://discourse.
datamethods.org/t/language-for-communicating-frequentist-results-about-treatment-effects/934,23 concerning a hypothetical 
trial that evaluating differences in systolic blood pressure (SBP)
Example 1 We were unable to find evidence against the hypothesis that A=B (p=0.4) with the current sample size. More 
data will be needed. As the statistical analysis plan specified a frequentist approach, the study did not provide 
evidence of similarity of A and B.
Example 2 Assuming the study’s experimental design and sampling scheme, the probability is 0.4 that another study would 
yield a test statistic for comparing two means that is more impressive that what we observed in our study, if 
treatment B had exactly the same true mean SBP as treatment A.
Example 3 Treatment B was observed in our sample of n subjects to have a 4 mm Hg lower mean SBP than treatment A with 
a 0.95 two-sided compatibility interval of (−13, 5), indicating a wide range of plausible true treatment effects. The 
degree of evidence against the null hypothesis that the treatments are interchangeable is p=0.11.
that statistical significance is often misinterpreted by the 
public,8 academic researchers9 and statisticians.10
Statements that the interventions were ‘similar’ (cate-
gory 8), there was no ‘substantial’ difference (category 3) 
or no ‘clinically important’ difference (category 6), which 
were used by smaller numbers of studies, are also diffi-
cult to interpret. None of them can be generally recom-
mended as a way to describe non-significant results, but 
all might be appropriate in different circumstances.
The most reasonable way to describe non-significant 
results is probably that the study did not find convincing 
evidence against the hypothesis that that the treatment 
effect was zero. Only one study contained a statement that 
referred to lack of evidence for a difference: ‘We found no 
evidence that an intervention comprising cleaner burning 
biomass-fuelled cookstoves reduced the risk of pneumonia 
in young children in rural Malawi,’11 describing an esti-
mated incidence rate ratio of 1.01, with 95% CI 0.91 to 
1.13. Hence the data were compatible with either a small 
increase, or a small decrease, in the risk of pneumonia.
Statistical methods
All of the trials in our sample used traditional frequentist 
statistical methods. Although this is the dominant statistical 
methodology in clinical trials, there are many problems in 
the understanding and interpretation of p values, signifi-
cance tests,1 12 13 and CIs,14 15 which have recently received 
substantial publicity, in the wake of publication of the 
American Statistical Association’s guidance on p values and 
significance testing2 and more recent publications.16–19
One important issue is the use of a threshold for ‘signif-
icance’, creating a binary classification of results, which is 
usually interpreted as indicating treatments that ‘work’ and 
‘don’t work’ (or ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ trials, or ‘effective’ 
and ‘ineffective’ treatments).19–21 In reality, there is no such 
sharp dividing line between treatments that work and do 
not work, and significance tests simply impose an arbitrary 
criterion. The persistence of dichotomisation of results may 
be largely due to an unrealistic expectation that trials will 
provide certainty in their conclusions and treatment recom-
mendations. Sometimes trials will reduce our uncertainty 
sufficiently that the best clinical course of action is clear, 
but often they will not. An argument that is often advanced 
in favour of dichotomisation of results is that because many 
trials seek to inform clinical practice, a decision needs to 
be made about whether the intervention should be used in 
patient care. The counter-argument to this is that decisions 
about use of healthcare interventions should be based not 
on whether a single primary outcome reaches an arbitrary 
significance threshold, but on consideration of the overall 
benefits, harms and costs of the intervention, using appro-
priate decision modelling methodology.
Improving the language for describing results
One straightforward way to improve reporting of results 
is to be more careful about the language that is used to 
describe them and draw conclusions, and ensure that 
written descriptions match the numerical results. We 
should avoid language that is ambiguous or open to misin-
terpretation, for example, only describing treatments as 
ineffective if we have a high degree of confidence that 
the treatment does not have clinically important effects. 
We should also pay more attention to uncertainty, and 
consider what possible values of the unknown underlying 
treatment effect could have given rise to the data that 
were observed. Often, this range will be wide. We should 
not expect every trial to lead to a clear treatment recom-
mendation, but be honest about the degree to which a 
study is able to reduce our uncertainty. CIs were originally 
promoted for trial reporting to encourage this sort of 
interpretation, and to avoid the false certainty provided 
by significance tests.22 23 But even though most trials now 
present them, they are rarely considered in the conclu-
sions,24 25 and are often used simply as an alternative 
way to perform significance tests, concentrating only on 
whether the CI excludes the null value.
A recent online discussion26 about language for 
describing frequentist trial results gave some examples of 
accurate statements that could be used. Three examples 
of statements for trials that did not find a treatment differ-
ence, from this discussion, are given in table 2. These 
statements are very different from those used by most of 
the papers in our sample, and make much more limited 
claims than many real papers. However, these claims 
accurately reflect the conclusions that can be drawn from 
frequentist statistical analyses. More accurate language 
would help to prevent common over-interpretations, such 
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as the belief that non-significance means that a treatment 
difference of zero has been established.
Improving the statistical methods
A more radical solution is to change the statistical approach 
that we use. One fundamental problem with traditional 
frequentist statistical methods is that they do not provide 
the results that clinicians, policy makers and patients actu-
ally want to know: what are the most plausible values of 
the treatment effect, given the observed data? Significance 
tests actually do the reverse; they calculate probabilities of 
the data (or more extreme data), assuming a specific null 
value of the treatment effect. This is a major reason why 
reporting frequentist results accurately is so convoluted, 
and why they are so difficult to understand. However, easi-
ly-interpretable probabilities of clinically relevant results 
can be readily obtained using Bayesian methods. The 
output from a Bayesian analysis is a probability distribution 
giving the probability of all possible values of the treatment 
effect, taking into account the trial’s data, and usually (via 
the prior), external information as well. We can use this 
distribution (the posterior probability distribution) to 
calculate relevant and informative results, such as the prob-
ability of a benefit exceeding a threshold for clinical impor-
tance, the probability of the treatment effect being within 
a range of clinical equivalence, or the range of treatment 
effects with 95% probability (or 50%, or any other value). 
Some examples of the sorts of informative statements that 
can be made from Bayesian results are given in a blog post 
by Frank Harrell.27 A particular advantage is that, with 
Bayesian methods, there is no need to reduce results to a 
dichotomy, but instead we can refer directly to probabilities 
of events of interest.
limitations of this study
This study looked only at reporting of results in abstracts 
of published RCTs. We concentrated on abstracts because 
they are the most frequently read parts of papers, and 
always report the main results. They are therefore likely to 
be particularly important in determining readers’ inter-
pretation of the trial’s results. It is possible that in other 
parts of the papers, reporting may have been different, 
and potentially more accurate. However, this is much 
harder to assess because results are typically reported in 
several different places, and often inconsistently.
We concentrated on four of the highest profile general 
medical journals. Obviously, RCTs are also published in a 
large number of other, more specialised, journals, but we 
cannot say whether they have the same issues of reporting 
as we found. Our expectation would be that, as the journals 
we selected are seen as some of the most prestigious publi-
cations, reporting problems would be at least as common 
elsewhere.
Our classification of reporting types was invented by 
the authors, and is not intended as a general tool for 
conducting this type of study. However, we feel that it is a 
reasonable classification that makes distinctions between 
the different types of reporting that we wished to identify.
COnCluSIOnS
Despite many years of warnings, inappropriate interpreta-
tions of RCT results are widespread in the most prestigious 
medical journals. We speculatively suggest several possible 
factors that may be responsible. First, authors and editors 
may want to present a clear message, and there is a wide-
spread expectation that RCTs should result in clear recom-
mendations for clinical practice. It is easier to understand a 
conclusion that ‘X did not work’ than a complicated state-
ment that more accurately reflects what a non-significant 
result means. Second, use of significance testing as the main 
analytical method provides a ready means of dichotomisa-
tion of results, encouraging an over-simplified binary inter-
pretation of interventions. Third, the general difficulty of 
understanding frequentist results means that correct inter-
pretation is convoluted and difficult to relate to real life.
We suggest that interpretation of results should pay more 
attention to uncertainty and the range of treatment effects 
that could plausibly have given rise to the observed data. 
Use of Bayesian statistical methods would facilitate this by 
addressing the clinical questions of interest directly.
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